The Council and the Court: Law and Politics in the Rise of the International Criminal Court by Kaye, David
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2752682 
 
 
Public Law & legal Theory Research Paper Series 
 



































Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2752682
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2752682 
KAYE & RAUSTIALA COUNCIL AND COURT 
 
 
The Council and the Court: Law and Politics 
in the Rise of the International Criminal Court 
ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A WORLD  
OF POWER POLITICS.  By David Bosco.  New York, NY:  
Oxford University Press, 2014.  312 pages.  $31.95. 
David Kaye* and Kal Raustiala** 
It is the rare international crisis today that does not receive the 
attention—or at least a demand for the attention—of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).  Name a conflict, and one is bound to find a coalition 
of states, nongovernmental organizations, and activists calling for ICC 
investigation, even where jurisdiction may be unavailing.  Over the course 
of 2014 to early 2016, for instance, one can point to Afghanistan,1 the 
Central African Republic,2 Georgia,3 Iraq,4 Mali,5 North Korea,6 Palestine,7 
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Syria,8 and Ukraine,9 to name a handful among many others.  Each situation 
presents a charged dynamic, in which the promoters of the rule of law seem 
pitted against the powers of global politics.  The Syria situation in particular 
is marked by clear violations of international humanitarian law across the 
spectrum of participants during years in which hundreds of thousands have 
lost their lives, leading to competing calls for justice and rejections of such 
a process within the United Nations Security Council.  President Omar al-
Bashir of Sudan, subject to an ICC arrest warrant for his alleged role in 
atrocities in the Darfur region, escaped arrest with the assistance of 
authorities in South Africa in mid-2015, highlighting the refusal of some 
ICC member–states to support the court in a case the Security Council 
referred to it years earlier.10  The ICC, in a historically short period of time, 
has become the central player in a contemporary battle over the place of 
justice in international politics. 
In Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of 
Power Politics, David Bosco ably documents both the long history of 
international justice efforts and the surprisingly rapid rise of the ICC.11  At 
its heart, Rough Justice tells a story suffused with the deep tensions 
between peace and justice, politics and law, and power and norms.  The 
push and pull between these antinomies is of course not new.  And it is not 
uncommon for power, politics, and the desire for peace to override law, 
norms, and the quest for justice—especially on the international plane, 
where mechanisms of justice have for decades, if not centuries, been more 
aspiration than reality.12  Yet the long and uncertain search for international 
justice and accountability for terrible crimes has taken on an entirely new 
tenor in the era of the ICC.  Bosco notes that, as the first standing 
international criminal court in history, the ICC “represents a remarkable 
transfer of authority from sovereign states to an international institution.”13 
The birth of the ICC represents the climax of the groundbreaking 
development of international criminal law that began after the end of the 
Cold War, about which we say more below.14  The ICC is, for some at least, 
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OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2000). 
13. BOSCO, supra note 11, at 2. 
14. See About the Court, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about% 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2752682
201X] KAYE & RAUSTIALA 3 
 
a stirring symbol of justice and law.  But the court was not born, nor does it 
reside, in a political vacuum.  Its most important political interlocutor is the 
United Nations Security Council.  The Council has long been seen as the 
apex of the international order, but it is also a body in which politics and 
power are paramount.  The Council has the authority to compel or authorize 
everything from economic sanctions (as in the case of Iran’s nuclear 
program) to outright invasions of sovereign states (as in Iraq over two 
decades ago).15  Its ambit is the peace and security of the entire world.  And 
it has been continuously operating, sometimes more and sometimes less 
effectively, since 1945.  The fledging ICC has consequently had to find a 
way to live and partner with the Council, acknowledging and leveraging the 
Council’s power while charting its own independent course.  This is an 
innately challenging task.  And it has been made even harder by the fact 
that three of the five permanent members of the Security Council—Russia, 
China, and the United States—have declined to join the ICC, and at various 
times have expressed views ranging from benign neglect to active hostility. 
The ICC has nonetheless survived and, as Bosco shows in Rough 
Justice, even thrived in the thirteen years since its establishment.  “Rough 
justice” may indeed be what results when the process of criminal 
adjudication is deeply permeated by politics.  And some would argue that 
there has been precious little justice, rough or otherwise.  Yet in the years 
since the 1998 Rome Conference that gave birth to the ICC, the court has 
developed an impressive record of activity: thirty-six individuals indicted, 
nine investigations opened, and proceedings against ten accused 
completed.16  With 123 member states—though, as noted, some very 
significant omissions—the ICC has also drawn considerable, if uneven, 
political support from around the world.17 
The time is ripe for a careful and accessible analysis of the ICC, its 
evolving role in international law, and its relationship to power politics.  
Rough Justice, a strikingly well-written and engaging book, does exactly 
that.  As Bosco argues, “The letter and spirit of the court’s governing statute 
reject the idea that power or political influence should influence the course 
of justice.  But the new court operates in a turbulent world where power 
matters.”18  Exactly how power matters, and what power means for the 
quest for international justice, are at the heart of this excellent work of 
scholarship and history. 
 
20the%20court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx [http://perma.cc/PFC2-QAC5] (describing the 
creation of the court).  See generally ANTONIO CASSESE ET AL., CASSESE’S INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW (3rd ed. 2013). 
15. U.N. Charter arts. 33–51. 
16. Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations% 
20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx [http://perma.cc/MHT7-284Q]. 
17. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20
statute.aspx [http://perma.cc/4PJE-KMHC] (listing the 123 states that are party to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court). [AU1] 
18. BOSCO, supra note 11, at 1. 
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I. The Pursuit of Peace in the Postwar Order 
At Dumbarton Oaks in the fall of 1944, as the Second World War still 
raged, the Allied powers laid down the basic structure of the postwar legal 
order.19  By installing the “Big Five”—the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and China—at the very core of the new 
United Nations (UN) organization, the major powers sought to rectify one 
of the main ills of the visionary but flawed League of Nations: its lack of 
effective enforcement.20  The newly created Security Council would be the 
executive committee of the postwar world, its members armed with an array 
of military forces and, as agreed at the Yalta conference, a veto for the five 
permanent members of the Council.21  The veto—which would go on to 
deeply vex observers and participants throughout the twentieth century and 
which continues to stymie efforts to address atrocities in places such as 
Syria today—was created for one extremely important reason: to protect the 
most vital interests of the most powerful states in the system.22  The veto, it 
was believed, would keep these key players active within the new UN 
order, rather than outside it.23 
The Security Council’s architecture functioned in some ways as 
designed.  The United States not only joined the new UN (unlike the 
original League); it remains committed to it and even serves as host nation 
for its headquarters.24  With some minor exceptions, the Soviets, the British, 
the French, and the Chinese all stayed in too, and occasionally found the 
Council useful and important.25  But as is well-known, in other ways the 
Security Council was a failure.  With the onset of the Cold War, the 
Council quickly became a forum for superpower rivalry, deadlocked on 
 
19. See generally ROBERT C. HILDERBRAND, DUMBARTON OAKS: THE ORIGINS OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR POSTWAR SECURITY 85–107 (1990). 
20. PAUL KENNEDY, THE PARLIAMENT OF MAN: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS 26–32 (2006). 
21. Id. 
22. Scott Sheeran, The U.N. Security Council Veto is Literally Killing People, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/08/11/the-un-
security-council-veto-is-literally-killing-people/ [http://perma.cc/69VC-ZJGQ] (noting that the 
veto was agreed upon as a “quid pro quo for [those] powerful states which had carried the heavy 
burden in World War II” and describing the ways in which the veto has frustrated international 
efforts to address conflicts); see also DAVID L. BOSCO, FIVE TO RULE THEM ALL: THE UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 30–31 (2009) (describing how 
the veto power given to the Security Council made the UN an institution that great powers could 
use to work together, rather than an institution for global governance); KENNEDY, supra note 18, 
at 26–27, 36 (explaining that the veto power was added to the UN Charter to give the United 
States and the Soviet Union sufficient power to convince the two to join the organization). 
23. See, e.g., BOSCO, supra note 20 at 36–37 (“In the end, the great powers fended off the 
challenge [to the veto] in the only way they could: by making clear that, without the veto, there 
would be no United Nations.”); KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 26–27, 36. 
24. Elisabeth Zoller, The National Security of the United States as the Host State for the 
United Nations, 1 PACE U. SCH. L. Y.B. INT’L L. 127, 127–28 (1989). 
25. See KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 53, 56–57 (describing the Great Powers’ use of vetos or 
the threat of vetos to advance security interests and lesser issues of national preference and 
discussing times of fissure, such as Russia’s one-time withdrawal from the Security Council over 
the exclusion of the People’s Republic of China or the power imbalance among the Great Powers 
that the Suez Crisis revealed). 
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almost any issue of paramount geopolitical importance.26  Many newly 
independent states saw the design of the body as an illegitimate expression 
of Great Power dominance and resented the fact that the only permanent 
member from what would come to be called the Global South was China.27 
Yet the Security Council remained at the center of the UN Charter 
system, and it had occasional successes when Soviet and American interests 
aligned or were weak.28  And when the world emerged from the Cold War 
in the early 1990s, new life flowed into the Council.29  As the dramatic 
rescue of Kuwait via the Gulf War demonstrated in 1991, the Council—
when cooperative—has the power to unleash effective and legitimate 
coercive authority.30  When hamstrung or inattentive, it can—as designed—
remain impotent, even in the face of massive and horrific threats to global 
order and human life.31 
The framers of the United Nations also created a legislature in the 
General Assembly, a judiciary in the International Court of Justice, and a 
bureaucracy led by a Secretary-General, giving the new system the rough 
outlines of a constitutional order.32  The Charter gave the United Nations 
(via the Council) the power to make rules and decisions that would be 
binding on states.33  In doing so, it ushered in a new era in international law 
and order. Security Council resolutions, many of them legally binding, 
flowed out of Turtle Bay, ranging from mild sanctions to the ultimate 
punishment: the authorization to use military force against a state.34  But for 
all its detail, the Charter did not create any mechanism for applying 
criminal sanctions to those individuals who control the actions of states 
(and other armed groups) and who thus bear ultimate responsibility for the 
grave crimes and atrocities that made the twentieth century the bloodiest in 
 
26. Id. at 55–56 (observing that lack of agreement among the Big Five dashed the larger 
ambitions for the Security Council and that unanimity was difficult to obtain except on issues of 
small import). 
27. This view continued and arguably accelerated after the end of the Cold War.  See, e.g., 
12th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, Final 
Document—Global Issues—Disarmament and International Security, ¶ 66(b) (Sept. 3, 1998) 
(“The Non-Aligned Countries are grossly under-represented in the Council.  This under-
representation should, therefore, be corrected by enlargement of the Security Council . . . to reflect 
the universal character of the world body, and to correct existing imbalances in the composition of 
the Security Council in a comprehensive manner . . . .”). 
28. See KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 58–59 (noting the impact on the Security Council of the 
general distrust between the Soviets and Americans but referencing less divisive issues that 
provided opportunities for agreement among the permanent council members). 
29. See id. at 63–64 (discussing the unprecedented cooperation among the permanent council 
members resulting from the thawing of the Cold War). 
30. See id. at 64–65 (describing the Council’s unified resolve regarding its actions in response 
to the Gulf War). 
31. See id. at 52, 59 (quoting U.S. Senator Arthur Vandenberg as saying that “the system 
worked” after an early use of the veto by the U.S.S.R. in response to the 1946 crisis in Lebanon 
and Syria and referencing instances of Council divisiveness regarding matters that might lead to a 
major war and threaten the collapse of the international security system). 
32. U.N. Charter art. 7, ¶ 1. 
33. Id. art. 25. 
34. See KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 99–100 (describing the variety of Security Council 
resolutions passed in response to the Balkan Wars). 
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history.35 
Indeed, the Charter is very much a Westphalian document.  States, and 
their sovereignty, are central to its design.36  Individuals appear, but far less 
prominently.37  Indeed, the Charter speaks only of the rights of individuals; 
individual criminal penalties arrived in international law later, in such 
ancillary instruments as the Genocide Convention of 1948 and the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949.38  Yet states are abstractions, legal entities; 
individuals are flesh and blood creatures who, ultimately, are the motive 
and culpable force behind abuses of human rights and violations of 
international law.  At the landmark postwar trials at Nuremberg, which took 
place within a year of the Charter’s adoption, the judgments would 
recognize this fact.39  The Charter itself did not.40  While Nuremberg was an 
early highwater mark for international justice, it would take many decades 
for individual justice to become embedded in the global legal order. 
II. The Turn to Justice 
It was the end of the Cold War that allowed individualized justice to 
begin to take center stage.  This shift was not only accompanied by a 
significant surge in Council cooperation and coercion; it was a direct result 
of it.41  After the fall of the Berlin Wall, an invigorated Council embraced 
individual accountability for heinous crimes by creating two criminal 
tribunals: the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) in 1993 and, shortly thereafter, for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994.42  
These Council-created courts broke new ground, and they have shaped 
international criminal law into a major field during their twenty years in 
force.  Ad hoc solutions to particular conflicts, the Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
tribunals nonetheless inspired governments and activists to believe that the 
international community could establish a permanent tribunal to address 
 
35. See U.N. Charter, arts. 41–42 (making no mention of criminal penalties in the list of 
available sanctions). 
36. Id. art. 2, ¶ 1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all 
its Members.”). 
37. See id. (making few references to individuals throughout, with the notable exception of 
the preamble, which indicates its purpose “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women”). 
38. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces 
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
39. Richard Overy, Making Justice at Nuremberg, 1945–1946, BBC (Feb. 17, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/war_crimes_trials_01.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/LT3U-LBR6]. 
40. See U.N. Charter (lacking provisions to hold individuals accountable). 
41. See KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 191–93 (describing the shift in focus to human rights 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War). 
42. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 3–4 (2006); Payam Akhavan, Current 
Developments, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of 
Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 501, 501 (1996). 
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war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide.43  A permanent 
tribunal would not depend on Council cooperation (the creation of the ad 
hoc tribunals avoided a veto, but the threat was always present).44  
Moreover, a permanent court would stand as a deterrent to would-be 
genocidaires and war criminals. 
The creation of the standing International Criminal Court in 2002 was 
thus a watershed moment, historic in its reach and its ambition.  The ICC 
takes international justice out of the direct control of the most political of 
international bodies—the Council—and thus moves the needle decisively 
toward law and away from politics.  Rough Justice documents the 
difficulty, diplomacy, and long effort that accompanied this triumph of 
legalism.  But the book also frankly acknowledges the many challenges that 
remain, many of which are driven by the complex relationship between law 
and politics that continues to vex the fledgling Court. 
Bosco demonstrates, with considerable detail, that the ICC was born 
with major infirmities.  Principal among them is that it has no police force, 
nor any reliably effective means by which to oblige states to cooperate to 
bring perpetrators it identifies to justice.45  This structural weakness 
compels the ICC to seek assistance from partners that have coercive 
powers.46  And there is no international institution better situated to assist 
the ICC than the Security Council.  The Security Council’s legitimacy—
shaky during the Cold War, stretched to the breaking point today—makes it 
an undeniably imperfect partner for the ICC.  Yet the Council remains the 
one entity in the global legal order with the power to compel states to assist 
the Court if it deems it in the interest of peace.  Together, then, the Council 
and the Court can be a formidable force for accountability.  Apart, their 
flaws are readily apparent—especially so for the still-novel ICC, which has 
yet to receive the sort of support from its own member states, let alone the 
three very powerful permanent members of the Council that remain 
nonparties, that its success requires. 
III. The Council–Court Relationship 
The preamble of the Rome Statute declares that the parties were 
determined “to establish an independent permanent International Criminal 
Court in relationship with the [U]nited Nations system.”47 [AU2]  Yet 
 
43. See Winston P. Nagan, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 127, 128 (1995) (observing that the ad hoc tribunals 
created for the crimes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda “invigorated momentum for a permanent 
international criminal tribunal”). 
44. See Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America and the 
International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. (SUPP.) 381, 386–87 (2002) (noting that the 
proposed permanent tribunal could investigate matters “without a Security Council request” and 
that its independence would “deprive permanent members of their veto”). 
45. See BOSCO, supra note 11, at 4, 56–57 (explaining that the ICC was born with significant 
lack of support and even opposition from several powerful states—including the United States—
and noting that the Court relies entirely on state police and military forces for success in 
apprehending suspects). 
46. Id. at 187–88 (discussing how the ICC has, over time, “become an instrument in the 
toolkit of [the] major powers” upon which it is dependent). 
47. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, pmbl., opened for signature July 17, 
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exactly how to be both “independent” and “in relationship with” was left 
unstated: how can an institution that is formally outside the UN system yet 
intertwined with its network of political and logistical support be truly 
independent?  The Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the UN, 
concluded in 2004, promises that the institutions will “respect each other’s 
status and mandate.”48  Yet it goes beyond respect to include an obligation 
of cooperation, as the parties agreed “they shall cooperate closely, 
whenever appropriate, with each other and consult each other on matters of 
mutual interest.”49 
In the years since the conclusion of the Relationship Agreement, the 
ICC has established working ties with the UN system as a whole.50  Support 
for the court, though often tinged with criticism, exists at all levels of the 
UN.51  The relationship with the UN that really matters to the ICC, 
however, is the one with the Security Council.  Yet this relationship 
remains uneven and uncertain.  Over the past decade, the Council’s attitude 
and posture toward the ICC have been variable and arguably even 
mercurial.  When convenient, the Council has offered rhetorical support for 
the Court’s work and even has, as with Libya and Darfur, actively engaged 
with it.52  But that has not stopped the Council—largely driven by the 
agendas of its five permanent members—from ignoring or even damaging 
the ICC when that stance serves its particular interests.53 
The exercise of power is thus central to this story.  Accordingly, in 
Rough Justice Bosco presents a politically grounded argument about how 
states—in particular, powerful states—have reacted to the arrival of the 
ICC.  States, he argues, face a choice among accommodating, 
marginalizing, or controlling the new Court.54  More often than not, Bosco 
claims, they try to construct mechanisms of control.55  Since the creation of 
the ICC means that “some of the world’s most powerful states lost 
ownership of international justice,” they often have responded by trying to 
rein the court in and regain control. 56  This struggle is central to the still-
emerging story of the birth and growth of the ICC. 
Bosco highlights many examples of state “control behavior” 
throughout Rough Justice, wisely focusing on the permanent five members 
 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 91 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (emphasis added). 
48. ICC-ASP Res.1, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/3/Res.1, at 3 (Sept. 7, 2004). 
49. Id. at 3. 
50. See INT’L PEACE INST., THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ICC AND THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2013) (explaining the “complex and delicate 
relationship” currently shared by the ICC and the UN). 
51. See Zoe Pearson, Non-Governmental Organizations and the International Criminal 
Court: Changing Landscapes of International Law, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 243, 252 (2006) 
(explaining that support for the ICC is complex and can often be contentious). 
52. See generally S.C. Res. 1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) (expressing concern about the violence in 
Libya and offering support); S.C. Res. 1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) (pledging to take all necessary action 
to prevent violations of human rights in Darfur). 
53. See BOSCO, supra note 9, at 39–45 (asserting that the five permanent members make 
decisions to protect their own interests). 
54. Id. at 11–15. 
55. Id. at 14–15. 
56. Id. at 21, 23. 
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of the Council (the so-called P5) and a handful of other key states and 
nongovernmental organizations.57  But it is not solely a story of control.  
The first term of President George W. Bush’s administration, for instance, 
presents a textbook case of marginalization, characterized by avowedly 
anti-ICC legislation and multiple U.S. efforts to shield Americans from the 
Court’s jurisdiction.58  By contrast, the broad European embrace of the 
ICC—ratifying the Rome Statute, regularly pressing for more political 
support—reflects acceptance and accommodation.59  Chinese and Russian 
attitudes toward the Court are less open and pronounced, and they are less 
discussed in Rough Justice.60  It is evident that China and Russia are 
accommodationist when accommodation is in their interests, but both have 
been generally transactional in their attitudes toward the ICC, their 
positions varying according to the policy interests at play.61 
To be sure, the ICC’s success is neither guaranteed by Council 
cooperation nor foreclosed by Council disregard.  The ICC has achieved 
successes and failures that have little to do with the Council’s assistance.  
Its on-again, off-again saga during the trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, who 
was ultimately convicted of war crimes, had more to do with prosecutorial 
decisions than UN cooperation.62  Its lengthy trials result mainly from the 
structure of the Rome Statute and the failure of the chambers to streamline 
proceedings and resist the avalanche of motions from all parties, including 
victim participants.63  The collapse of the case against Kenya’s President 
Uhuru Kenyatta has roots in the prosecution’s approach, the intimidation of 
witnesses by those associated with Kenyan authorities, and the African 
Union’s political engagement, much more than any action—or inaction—on 
the part of the Security Council.64 
Bosco goes beyond the maneuvers of states, however, to show how 
 
57. See id. at 39–45 (giving examples of how the P5 has tried to control the ICC, such as by 
screening complaints and suggesting that any new court should be controlled by the Security 
Council). 
58. See id. at 71–75 (explaining that after the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United 
States government developed an aggressive antiterrorism policy and sought to give American 
citizens immunity from the ICC). 
59. See id. at 84, 179 (noting the understanding that “the European powers were the principal 
movers behind” the ICC and the European Union’s encouragement of the ratification of the Rome 
Statute). 
60. See generally id. (failing to address Chinese and Russian attitudes to the same extent as 
European attitudes). 
61. The Russian and Chinese statements at an open ICC debate at the Security Council in 
October 2012 provide evidence of such transactional attitudes.  See Rep. of the S.C., at 11–12, 19–
20, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6849 (Oct. 17, 2012) (showing that China and Russia supported the efforts of 
the U.N. to create international peace). 
62. Cf. Larry D. Johnson, The Lubanga Case and Cooperation Between the UN and the ICC, 
10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 887, 887 (2012) (“During its first case, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) faced several challenges. One of these challenges—which almost derailed the whole trial—
was the implementation of the cooperation regime with the United Nations . . . .”). 
63. See Carsten Stahn et al., Participation of Victims in Pre-Trial Proceedings of the ICC, 4 J. 
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 219, 238 (2006) (explaining that the Pre-Trial Chamber must balance the rules 
allowing victim participation with the defendant’s right to reasonably speedy proceedings). 
64. Alex Whiting, The ICC in Kenya: Institutional Promises and Limitations, JUST SECURITY 
(Sept. 15, 2015, 9:14 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/26087/icc-kenya/ 
[https://perma.cc/M267-2TK2]. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2752682
10 TEXAS LAW REVIEW [VOL. XX:PPP 
 
ICC officials, aiming not to be pawns in a great power game themselves, 
tried to shape that power dynamic to their own ends.  The first prosecutor, 
Luis Moreno Ocampo of Argentina, went to European capitals to lobby for 
his job with an “itinerary [that] reflected an understanding that while more 
than seventy states had joined the court [at that time, 2003], the European 
powers were the principal movers behind the new institution.”65  On 
balance, however, the Court has seemed to come out on the losing side 
when it has sought to play the power game.66  Bosco is sensitive to the 
challenges faced by Moreno-Ocampo.67  But despite the prosecutor’s vision 
of engaging and speaking the language of states when necessary, Bosco 
notes that he sometimes alienated them, triggering numerous crises.68  
Moreny-Ocampo’s chief prosecutorial legacy—an understandable focus on 
African situations that ultimately led to a deeply fraught and problematic 
relationship with the African Union—reinforces Bosco’s presentation of 
evidence that the ICC has been significantly constrained by major-power 
interests.69 
No realist will be surprised that great power politics has constrained 
the ICC.  But what about the flip-side?  What has—and what can—the 
Security Council do to further the ICC’s mission of justice?  There are 
several Council powers that can in theory benefit the court’s activity.  There 
is the power, embedded in the Rome Statute, to refer a situation to the court 
for investigation and possible prosecution.70  There is the power to 
authorize a state to use force that would otherwise be illegal under the UN 
Charter, such as cross-border force to apprehend an individual fugitive 
wanted by the ICC.71  There is the power to obligate all states to cooperate 
with the court, as the Council did when it directly created war crimes 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994, 
respectively.72 
These are meaningful powers.  And yet the Council almost never 
wields them; indeed, it never deployed the last two noted powers in the two 
cases that the Council itself referred to the ICC.  In one case only has the 
Council authorized UN forces to support the arrest of ICC indictees.73  It 
 
65. BOSCO, supra note 11, at 84. 
66. Cf. Alana Tiemessen, The International Criminal Court and the Politics of Prosecutions, 
18 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 444, 458 (2014) (concluding that there is a “clear pattern of politicization in 
the ICC’s prosecutions” that indicates the court is being manipulated by the member states, 
undermining the court’s “credibility and legitimacy”). 
67. See BOSCO, supra note 9, at 84–86 (acknowledging that Moreno-Ocampo was a 
determined investigator, but faced a difficult question of how to prosecute the Iraq war). 
68. See id. at 151–52 (noting that the prosecutor was criticized by certain African leaders and 
the media). 
69. Id. at 151, 187. 
70. Rome Statute, supra note 45, art. 13. 
71. See U.N. Charter art. 42, ¶ 1 (stating that in certain circumstances the Security Council 
“may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security”). 
72. See S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 2 (Nov. 8, 1994) (deciding that “all States shall cooperate fully” with 
the Rwanda Tribunal); S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 4 (May 25, 1993) (deciding the same for the Yugoslavia 
Tribunal). 
73. See S.C. Res. 2098, ¶ 12(d) (Mar. 28, 2013) (expanding the mandate of the UN 
peacekeeping operation, MONUSCO, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). 
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has provided mainly limited political or rhetorical support for the several 
other situations pending before the court today.74  In fact, the Council has 
more often exercised its power to limit the reach of the ICC, using such 
tools as jurisdictional exemptions and funding limitations in the resolutions 
referring the Darfur and Libya situations.75  In short, the Council has shown 
itself more than a match for the forces of international justice and ICC 
autonomy. 
IV. Council Cooperation and the Independence of the Court 
The heavy shadow cast by the Council has led many partisans of 
international justice to consider how the ICC might be more independent 
and less prone to political influence.  ICC independence can be thought of 
in three ways: judicial independence, prosecutorial discretion, and 
institutional independence.  Several years ago, then professor (now Judge) 
Theodor Meron laid out the internal and external factors necessary for an 
independent judiciary in the international context.76  At its most abstract and 
general, judicial independence demands that judges be free from influence 
external to the legal and factual situations they are obligated to adjudicate—
including, and perhaps especially, from their home states.  Similarly, others 
have argued that prosecutors in international tribunals must enjoy the 
independence to investigate alleged crimes committed by all parties to a 
conflict, free of political pressure, however well-intentioned.77  For 
instance, a Council referral directing the prosecution of specific individuals 
would clearly interfere with prosecutorial independence.  The Rome Statute 
seeks to protect both judicial and prosecutorial independence, focusing on 
internal and external factors that could inappropriately influence court 
actors—in particular, the prosecutor.78  As Bosco writes, “[a]t the heart of 
the court is an independent prosecutor responsible for reviewing complaints 
and information about possible crimes, conducting investigations, 
 
74. DAVID KAYE ET AL., THE COUNCIL AND THE COURT: IMPROVING SECURITY COUNCIL 
SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1 (2013). 
75. See S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 6 (Feb. 26, 2011) (deciding “that nationals, current or former 
officials or personnel from a State outside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which is not a party to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by the Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has 
been expressly waived by the State”); S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 7 (Mar. 31, 2005) (recognizing that 
expenses from the referral “shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and those States that 
wish to contribute voluntarily”). 
76. Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment, Judicial Independence and Impartiality in 
International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 359, 360–61 (2005); see also Martin 
Shapiro, Judicial Independence: New Challenges in Established Nations, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 253, 258–60 (2013) (explaining challenges to judicial independence, such as 
constitutional review of decisions creating conflict between judges and the government, 
“judicialization” of politics giving judges potential kickbacks from making specific decisions, and 
long-arm proliferation expanding a court’s jurisdiction). 
77. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON 
THE ROME STATUTE 47–48 (2010) (discussing the “seductive argument holding that justice should 
be even-handed, and that atrocities perpetrated on both sides must receive equal attention”). 
78. See id. at 564–66, 801 (explaining factors that could inappropriately influence judges, such 
as financial interests in the outcome of the case and the requirement that judges’ and prosecutors’ 
functions in open court are impartial). 
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requesting arrest warrants, and prosecuting those on trial.”79 
Institutional independence differs from judicial and prosecutorial 
independence, though all three are connected.  Judicial and prosecutorial 
independence speak to the influence exercised by external actors in specific 
cases before the court, disadvantaging particular defendants or undermining 
the credibility of judicial or prosecutorial decisions. Institutional 
independence addresses more generally the ways in which external actors 
shape the overall docket of the ICC, as well as its practices and trajectory.80  
Individual states, which may refer situations to the court for investigation, 
and the Council itself may both strongly influence the overall focus and 
direction of the court. Indeed, the court’s docket today is not the result of 
wholly independent decisions on the merits.  Instead, Sudan and Libya were 
both Council referrals, and Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
the Central African Republic, and Mali were all state self-referrals.81  An 
independent judicial institution may not have opened investigations in any 
one of these six situations. 
At Rome and in its lead up, discussions around jurisdiction and the 
ability to refer cases were largely framed in terms of the concept of 
gatekeeping.82  The case for a more dependent ICC rested on the realities of 
world politics: when global security is at stake, the pursuit of individual 
justice can block meaningful peace deals and constrain negotiators’ options.  
Peace, according to this position, must sometimes trump justice.  And to do 
so, the processes of international justice must serve peace, not interfere with 
it.  This conception had and retains many admirers.83  As a result, some 
 
79. BOSCO, supra note 11, at 54. 
80. See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 277 (1997) (stating that the independence of the 
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights from the state as part of a 
supranational jurisdiction has resulted in “a ‘community of law’: a partially insulated sphere in 
which legal actors interact based on common interests and values, protected from direct political 
interference”); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 
93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 67 (2005) (noting that designers of newer tribunals have tried to provide 
them with a high level of institutional independence in order to “increase the courts’ legitimacy 
and ultimately their ability to achieve compliance”); Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of 
International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 257 (2012) (describing 
the link between external actors and judicial independence). 
81. ICC Investigations & Cases, AM. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS COALITION 
INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.amicc.org/icc/cases [http://perma.cc/ZM8Q-VFXZ]. 
82. See Eric P. Schwartz, The United States and the International Criminal Court: The Case 
for “Dexterous Multilateralism,” 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 223, 225, 231 (2003) (explaining how the 
United States supported a “gatekeeper” role for the UN Security Council in order to prohibit 
countries from being subject to the Court’s jurisdiction without consent). 
83. Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in 
Strategies of International Justice, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 2003/04, at 5, 6 (“Justice does not 
lead [peace]; it follows. . . .  [N]orm-governed political order must be based on a political bargain 
among contending groups and on the creation of robust administrative institutions that can 
predictably enforce the law. Preventing atrocities and enhancing respect for the law will 
frequently depend on striking politically expedient bargains that create effective political 
coalitions to contain the power of potential perpetrators of abuses . . . .”); cf. Mariano-Florentino 
Cuéllar, The Limits of the Limits of Idealism: Rethinking American Refugee Policy in an Insecure 
World, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 401, 404–05 (2007) (advocating a “pragmatic approach” to 
refugee problems termed “strategic humanitarianism” that would “develop[] protocols to monitor, 
restrict, and redirect aid” in order to “lower the risk that aid funneled through the refugee system 
will subsidize ongoing conflict”); id. at 432 (“Idealism without limits is all but impossible, as no 
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sought to place the Security Council fully in control of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction.84  This would ensure that politics trumped legalism.  Not 
unrelatedly, it also would give the P5 a special measure of influence. 
The Rome negotiators ultimately rejected the idea of the Council as 
primary gatekeeper.  Instead, the Rome Statute rests jurisdiction principally 
on the traditional pillar of state consent, a deliberate move aimed at 
bolstering the court’s independence and placing law over politics.85  The 
Rome Statute also gave the prosecutor proprio motu power—the power to 
initiate an investigation at the prosecutor’s own discretion, though such an 
investigation has to be approved by a panel of judges.86  In Rough Justice 
Bosco notes that the United States and China in particular opposed this 
provision, fearing “it would afford the prosecutor too much discretion and 
insist[ing] that if neither a state party nor the Security Council referred a 
situation, it likely was not of international concern.”87 
The flipside was that many other actors feared granting the Security 
Council too much power to refer situations to the court.88  The more the 
Security Council was linked to the court, the more it could become a tool of 
the Council, subject to the political dynamics of the moment.  In the end, 
the Council’s powers were cabined.  Referrals may not direct the prosecutor 
to reach particular outcomes, nor can they pinpoint specific individuals.89  
Yet the Council was given an important power to start and stop court 
investigations if, in its view, security concerns necessitated it.90  Reflective 
of the power dynamics of world politics, it was the sort of pragmatic 
decision that, like the insertion of the veto for the P5 in the Charter, could 
help save idealism from itself.91 
The compromise struck in Rome between a vision of robust judicial 
 
American refugee policy can long survive if pivotal constituencies find it irretrievably at odds 
with American interests.  But a policy of limits without idealism in a world capable of 
engendering such capacious misery and expectations of American leadership poses its own 
dangers.”). 
84. HEMI MISTRY & DEBORAH RUIZ VERDUZCO, CHATHAM HOUSE, THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 (2012) (“Article 13(b) was the product 
of a negotiation that sought to delimit the appropriate relationship between a permanent 
international criminal court and the UN Security Council, the latter being the primary organ 
responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.  Article 13(b), in conjunction 
with Article 16 . . . sought to reconcile the concerns of those who wished to establish a permanent 
and independent international criminal court, a tribunal independent from the politics of the 
Security Council, and those on the other hand who sought to establish the court subject to the 
control of the Security Council.”). 
85. And, some would argue, justice over peace. 
86. Rome Statute, supra note 45, art. 15. 
87. BOSCO, supra note 11, at 55. 
88. See id. (explaining that although some were disappointed with the compromise on the 
ICC’s jurisdiction, it was still too extensive for some countries because their citizens could be 
exposed to prosecution). 
89. Rome Statute, supra note 45, arts. 14–15. 
90. See id. art. 16 (“No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with 
under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that 
effect . . . .”). 
91. For an example of this kind of thinking, see generally KENNEDY, supra note 18, which 
traces the evolution of the United Nations, including the balance between pragmatism and 
idealism. 
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and prosecutorial independence and the reality of power politics left many 
dissatisfied.  The United States, China, and Russia never joined the ICC, in 
part due to their dissatisfaction with the jurisdictional structure created at 
Rome.92  On the other hand, no less a figure than Louise Arbour, former 
chief prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR and UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, argued that the Council–court relationship embedded at 
Rome created deep threats to the court’s independence.93  That the Council 
can shape the court’s jurisdiction through referrals or suspend proceedings 
based on security concerns seems to give an overtly political—and 
unrepresentative—body control over a core judicial function.  Yet to work 
well a court needs a cop, and this recognition guided many of the delegates 
in Rome to seek a balance of sorts between Council control and court 
inconsequence. 
The court nonetheless struggled to attract a full range of member 
states.  As Bosco writes, the ICC “attracted dozens of new member states 
and established linkages with key intergovernmental organizations.  The 
process of international acceptance was incomplete however.  The court 
made only limited progress in attracting major powers that had opted to stay 
outside the system.”94  Three of those major powers—China, Russia, and 
the United States—just happened to be permanent members of the Security 
Council.95 
V. From Hostility to Engagement 
Just eleven days after the Rome Statute entered into force in 2002, the 
United States successfully demanded the adoption of Security Council 
Resolution 1422, which sought to protect UN peacekeepers from the ICC’s 
jurisdiction if they hailed from non-Rome Statute states.96  Adopted as a 
measure under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the provision that enables 
the Council to suspend proceedings before the court, the effort had limited 
support in the law, but the United States was determined to hold 
peacekeeping—especially in the Balkans—hostage to its demand.97  
However, after two years, opposition grew such that the Bush 
administration abandoned the annual effort.98 
In 2005, in the wake of the Security Council-mandated Commission of 
Inquiry’s condemnation of massive atrocities in Darfur, ICC supporters 
 
92. See BOSCO, supra note 9, at 55 (explaining the fear some countries had that the ICC’s 
jurisdiction went too far because it allowed for their citizens to be prosecuted). 
93. See Louise Arbour, Doctrines Derailed?: Internationalism’s Uncertain Future, INT’L 
CRISIS GROUP (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-
type/speeches/2013/arbour-doctrines-derailed-internationalism-s-uncertain-future.aspx  
[http://perma.cc/3LSM-J22T] (“Council referrals may in fact underscore the Court’s impotence 
rather than enhance its alleged deterrent effect.”). 
94. BOSCO, supra note 11, at 131. 
95. Countries Elected Members of the Security Council, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/elected.asp [http://perma.cc/6RG9-TA2U] (listing 
China, Russia, and the United States as permanent members, never elected to the council). 
96. S.C. Res. 1422, ¶ 1 (July 12, 2002). 
97. See generally id. 
98. BOSCO, supra note 9, at 103–04. 
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were confident enough to turn to the court for accountability.99  On 
March 31, 2005, the Council took its first, landmark step toward the court, 
referring the situation in Darfur to the court.100  China and the United States 
abstained, while Russia, the United Kingdom, and France—the latter two 
then and still now the only ICC member states on the Council—cast votes 
in favor.101  The price for U.S. abstention, as opposed to a veto, was high: 
the referral resolution barred UN funding of ICC activities pursuant to the 
resolution, sought to preclude jurisdiction over Rome Statute nonparties 
apart from Sudan, and—in contrast to the resolutions establishing the ICTY 
and ICTR—failed to obligate states outside of Sudan and the Rome Statute 
to cooperate with the court.102  The Council thus expanded the court’s 
jurisdiction while limiting its ability to carry out its mandate. 
This state of affairs frustrated many ICC supporters, and not least the 
then-prosecutor himself, Moreno-Ocampo.  As Bosco recounts, 
Frustrated by the fickle commitment of states, the prosecutor 
delivered a scathing speech at a Nuremberg conference on 
international justice in May 2007.  He complained that the court 
faced incessant—and, to his mind, unfair—calls to accommodate 
itself to political realities.  “We also hear officials of States Parties 
calling for amnesties, the granting of immunities and other ways to 
avoid prosecutions, supposedly in the name of peace.”  The 
prosecutor insisted that “there can be no political compromise on 
legality and accountability” and he laid down a daunting challenge 
for states: “Dealing with the new legal reality is not easy. It needs 
political commitment; it needs hard and costly operational decisions: 
arresting criminals in the context of ongoing conflicts is a difficult 
endeavor. . . .  If the States Parties do not actively support the Court, 
in this area as in others, then they are actively undermining it.”103 
This somewhat curious echo of the Bush Doctrine104 makes plain how 
much frustration was felt in the Hague over the inability, or more to the 
point, the unwillingness of powerful states to help the ICC work.  The locus 
of that frustration was the Security Council. 
For its part, the Council did not deign to answer the Prosecutor nor to 
pay much, if any, attention to the court—even to provide support for efforts 
on Darfur, which it had referred.105  From the adoption of the Darfur referral 
in 2005 to the adoption of the Libya referral on February 23, 2011, not a 
single Security Council resolution offered support for the work of the ICC, 
 
99. Rep. of the Int’l Comm. of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General, at 4, U.N. Doc. 
S/2005/60 (Jan. 31, 2005). 
100. S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
101. U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg. at 2, 3, 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
102. S.C. Res. 1593, ¶¶ 6, 7 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
103. BOSCO, supra note 11, at 131 (omission in original). 
104. There are various things so labeled but, recall President Bush’s famed post-9/11 
statement to a joint session of Congress: “Every nation in every region now has a decision to 
make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”  President George W. Bush, Address 
Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 
September 11 (Sept. 20, 2001), http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript 
[http://perma.cc/7NFG-B4D5]. 
105. S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 7 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2752682
16 TEXAS LAW REVIEW [VOL. XX:PPP 
 
even though the court’s work in Africa overlapped neatly with situations 
that seized the Council.106 
Then, something changed. Beginning in early 2011, the Council 
expressed new interest in the court, repeatedly (and approvingly) noting it 
in its resolutions and debates.  Yet a close inspection reveals a pattern of 
mixed signals and uneven (and usually hollow) support.  On the one hand, 
the Council referred the situation in Libya to the ICC for investigation and 
prosecution in February 2011 in what was widely seen as a supportive 
symbol of the role the ICC might play in preventing mass atrocity.107  Over 
the course of the next three years, the Council repeatedly welcomed the role 
of the ICC in a variety of contexts, regularly citing its work with support, 
especially outside of the referral-situation countries.108  Council members—
including the United States, China, and Russia—held an open meeting in 
2012 that left an impression of widespread support for the court and its 
work.109 
The Council crossed the Rubicon from rhetorical to logistical and 
military support for the ICC in the context of the long-standing and 
extensive conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).  In 
2013, the Council authorized the establishment of an “Intervention 
Brigade” as part of the UN’s peacekeeping force in the DRC.110  The 
authorization, remarkable for its provision of an offensive capability to a 
peacekeeping force,111 was also notable for the support it offered the ICC.  
The Intervention Brigade, the resolution provided, would be expected to 
work with the court and the Government of the DRC “to arrest and bring to 
justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the 
country.”112 
The Intervention Brigade, however, represents a rare form of concrete 
support for the work of the ICC.  Overall, despite these recent steps the 
Council has shown a marked reluctance to flex its muscle to generate 
 
106. See Security Council, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=sc 
[https://perma.cc/T38R-ZHC7] (documenting Security Council discussions pertaining to the ICC 
and showing no resolutions regarding the ICC between Darfur and Libya). 
107. S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 4 (Feb. 26, 2011). See, for example, the statement from Mr. Hardeep 
Singh Puri (India), as well as statements from France and Germany.  U.N. SCOR, 66th Sess., 
6491st mtg. at 2, 5–6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6491 (Feb. 26, 2011) (“[W]e note that several members of 
the Council . . . believe that referral to the Court would have the effect of an immediate cessation 
of violence and the restoration of calm and stability.”). 
108. See Colum Lynch, The World’s Court vs. the American Right, FOREIGN POL’Y: TURTLE 
BAY,  (Feb. 11, 2013), http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/02/11/the_icc_vs_ 
american_conservatives [http://perma.cc/N42K-EBG8] (quoting the French U.N. envoy as 
recognizing the key role that the ICC plays in preventing atrocities). 
109. See generally U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6849th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.6849 (Oct. 17, 
2012). 
110. Bruce ‘Ossie’ Oswald, The Security Council and the Intervention Brigade: Some Legal 
Issues, ASIL INSIGHTS (June 6, 2013), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/15/security-
council-and-intervention-brigade-some-legal-issues [http://perma.cc/VU8V-P7EP]. 
111. Id.  The Security Council first sent such a peacekeeping force to the Congo in 1960. S.C. 
Res. 143 (July 14, 1960). 
112. S.C. Res. 2098, ¶ 12(d) (Mar. 28, 2013).  The Brigade saw some success when it helped 
bring about the end of M23. Press Release, Sec. Council, Security Council Issues Statement 
Welcoming End of Hostilities by ‘M23’ in Democratic Republic of Congo, U.N. Press Release 
SC/11174 (Nov. 14, 2013). 
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broader cooperation by other states.  That reluctance continues to this day.  
On Libya, the Council’s follow-through has been tepid at best.  As soon as 
the Qaddafi regime began to crumble, leading Council members’ support 
for the ICC’s role faded away.113  On Sudan, the Council has barely 
addressed the lack of state cooperation, despite repeated requests for 
engagement by the ICC.114  This led Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, who 
succeeded Moreno-Ocampo in 2012, to deliver an impassioned plea to the 
Council during her semiannual report on the situation in Darfur in 2013, 
using powerful language rarely heard in the Council chamber.  Emphasizing 
her “frustration and despair at the Council’s inaction and paralysis 
regarding the situation in Darfur,” the prosecutor detailed how the lack of 
Council support has undermined her work.115 
VI. Looking Forward  
In his conclusion to Rough Justice, Bosco writes: 
It will not be surprising if the world is willing to tolerate an 
international justice system constrained by major-power interests. . . .  
[O]ther significant international justice initiatives have been 
influenced and constrained by political considerations.  Instead of 
being denounced for their defects and limitations, these instruments 
were mostly celebrated and, in fact, served as the inspiration for the 
ICC.  Double standards are deeply rooted in existing global 
governance structures, and the new court appears more likely to 
reflect those than to alter them.116 
It is undeniable that Council support is a necessary, if insufficient, 
component of any long-run success for the ICC.  For the court, the question 
is how to engage the Council in a way that does not fundamentally 
compromise its essential independence—or perhaps, how to do so in a way 
that acceptably compromises the court’s independence while enhancing its 
effectiveness.  For the Council, the question is how to partner with the ICC 
to ensure that its primary responsibility—the maintenance of international 
peace and security—can be more effectively achieved.  In what follows, we 
offer some reflections as well as some concrete suggestions about the way 
forward. 
A number of international workshops and conferences in recent years 
have brought experts and observers together to evaluate and understand the 
Council’s behavior.117  All of these efforts aim toward identifying an 
 
113. Mark Kersten, Used and Abandoned: Libya, the UN Security Council and the ICC, JUST. 
CONFLICT (Aug. 31, 2011), http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/08/31/used-and-abandoned-libya-the-
un-security-council-and-the-icc [http://perma.cc/VV5W-FDLH]. 
114. U.N. SCOR, 68th Sess., 7080th mtg. at 2–4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7080 (Dec. 11, 2013). 
115. Id. at 2. 
116. BOSCO, supra note 9, at 189. 
117. See, e.g., INT’L PEACE INST., supra note 48, at 2 (noting a meeting’s conclusion that 
improvements in the relationship between the Security Council and the ICC are needed; KAYE ET 
AL., supra note 72, at 17–23 (reporting the findings of a workshop held to discuss improving 
support for the ICC); MISTRY & VERDUZCO, supra note 82, at 2 (summarizing the conference 
held to discuss the development of the relationship between the UN Security Council and the 
ICC). 
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optimal level of support by the Council for the court.118  What kind of 
support could the ICC expect, and how could that support be generated?  
What types of situations would be appropriate for the Council to refer?  
When might the Council use its Rome Statute authority to defer an ongoing 
investigation?  The prescriptions tend to fall into categories of structure and 
substance, wish-list and realpolitik, short-term and long-term.  In principle, 
they do not question the premises underlying a strong Council–court 
relationship.  But the results of these meetings—the formal papers and 
reports—tend to hide a vigorous discussion over the nature and value of the 
relationship. 
First, while there are obvious advantages to a relationship with the 
Security Council, what risks does such a relationship pose for the court?  
The Council is an unabashedly political institution.  While procedural rules 
may govern its working calendar, and diplomatic and military realities may 
constrain its actions, few substantive rules constrain its decisions.119  The 
Council does not need to distinguish and explain one situation from the 
next.  Its decisions often appear unprincipled, driven by the political, 
economic, or military equities of the P5 rather than a reasoned accounting 
of when it should invoke Chapter VII of the Charter.120  While a lack of 
principle well serves an institution that must balance competing interests 
from crisis to crisis, it nonetheless undermines its claim to be acting in the 
interests of the international community as a whole, calling attention not 
merely to the Council’s inconsistencies but also to its claim of 
representativeness and ability to speak to the security concerns of all UN 
members.121  None of this is new.  The Council cannot be judged according 
to the same standards as a court of law.  But its political nature sits uneasily 
alongside notions of individual culpability for atrocities. 
This then is a key risk of the court’s relationship with the Council: 
unless it protects itself, the court increasingly will become entangled in the 
politics and credibility gap of the Council, tarred by its association with a 
body that has significant power to shape its docket.  The Council refers 
Libya but not Syria, Sudan but not Sri Lanka.122  It expands the ICC’s 
jurisdiction while purporting to limit the reach of its cases so as to protect 
nonstate parties.123  This kind of selectivity will continue, as selectivity is 
 
118. See, e.g., INT’L PEACE INST., supra note 47, at 5 (discussing a strategy for improving the 
Security Council support of the ICC through arrest warrants); KAYE ET AL., supra note 72, at v 
(stating that the goal of the workshop was to foster optimal support of the ICC by the Security 
Council); MISTRY & VERDUZCO, supra note 82, at 9–10 (suggesting that the Security Council 
could properly support the ICC through coordination of approach and procedure). 
119. UNITED NATIONS, PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
(1983). 
120. See David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 
87 AM. J. INT’L L. 552, 562–65 (1993) (noting that a “major charge against the Security 
Council[‘s legitimacy] is that it is dominated by several of the permanent members” and 
describing how the P5 members are able to exert dominance over the Council’s decisions). 
121. See id. at 558 (providing examples of how the perceptions of illegitimacy may work 
against the effectiveness of the Security Council, such as a state having difficulty convincing its 
citizenry that the Council’s action, which is UN-authorized, is supportive of community concerns 
rather than the “thinly veiled imperialism of the Council’s permanent members”). 
122. Situations and Cases, supra note 14. 
123. See supra text accompanying notes 98–105 (illustrating how the Council “expanded the 
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simply an everyday feature of Council behavior across the vast range of 
issue areas it addresses.  But this selectivity, coupled with the seeming 
inability of the ICC to expand its own reach to state parties beyond Africa, 
highlights that the ICC has limited capacity to achieve its purpose, as 
emphasized in the Rome Statute’s Preamble, “to guarantee lasting respect 
for and the enforcement of international justice.”124 
This risk of entanglement may be a feature of the Rome Statute 
inasmuch as it enables the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over situations 
referred by the Council.  As the work of both institutions continues to 
overlap, the ICC may find it difficult to protect itself from such 
politicization, but it is not without tools.  Most importantly, it needs a 
strategy for dealing with Council referrals—not only the fact of referral but 
also the politicized elements of referrals that seek to limit the ICC’s 
jurisdiction and funding and fail to promote state cooperation. 
Conversely, a strong relationship with the Council may be desirable 
from the ICC’s perspective, but is it desirable for the Council?  What does 
the Council gain from the court?  The Council is an institution with 
extraordinary lawmaking powers, uniquely able to compel action by or 
against any UN member state.125  It can even, as it did in the 1990s with the 
ICTY and ICTR, create ad hoc courts to address the aftermath of 
atrocities.126  All this suggests that the Council actually needs little from the 
ICC, and indeed the balance of power is undeniably in the Council’s favor.  
Yet the ICC, deliberately designed not to be under the direct supervision of 
the Council, is a reality—and as such is both a new tool and partner to the 
Council and a possible rival and competitor.  The court can legitimate 
Council actions and share in the burden of addressing pressing international 
problems.  The court can take action when the Council does not want to. 
But the court can also complicate and even disrupt the work of the Council, 
particularly in situations where a majority of the Council seeks a resolution 
to a crisis that may involve an actor accused or indicted of grave crimes.  A 
full inquiry into these conflicting interests and incentives cannot be carried 
out here, but we can at least survey the waterfront. 
Consider first the challenges posed to the Council by the court.  That 
the ICC can initiate investigations without a green light from the Council 
was a hard-won victory for those who sought meaningful judicial 
independence.  The original vision of the Council as a decisive body 
required that it be empowered to act with dispatch against threats to the 
peace.  That the great powers (at least as of 1945) had a permanent place 
 
Court’s jurisdiction while limiting its ability to carry out its mandate” in part because of non-state-
parties’ actions that sought to preclude the court’s jurisdiction over them). 
124. Rome Statute, supra note 47, pmbl. 
125. U.N. Charter art. 25. 
126. See The ICTR in Brief, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, 
http://www.unictr.org/en/tribunal [http://perma.cc/GGV2-P4SD] (reporting that the Council 
established the ICTR in 1995 to prosecute human rights violators during the Rwandan genocide); 
About the ICTY, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/en/about [http://perma.cc/762S-VE7C] (reporting that the Council established 
the ICTY as an ad hoc court in 1993 to address war crimes committed during the Balkan conflicts 
in the 1990s). 
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and veto was designed to allow that decisive action to take place only when 
no vital interest of a permanent member was threatened.  This structure—
inevitably frustrating to justice and fairness—was deemed essential lest the 
world once again risk devolving into an unimaginably horrific global 
conflagration. 
The ICC’s ability to initiate prosecutions does not alter this structure.  
But it permits a new and notable international organization to address core 
questions of international security in ways that can impinge on the 
traditional prerogatives of the Council and, perhaps, to interfere with the 
delicate politicking necessary to achieve peace.  And it inevitably creates a 
new star in the international galaxy, one that has the potential to command 
both popular and diplomatic attention.  While the Council can defer an ICC 
prosecution that it does not want, that decision must be renewed every 
twelve months (and, like any other substantive decision of the Council, 
must secure nine votes and no vetoes).127  In short, the ICC can inject itself 
into areas of concern to the Council and, as long as one permanent member 
is supportive of the court, the Council can do nothing about it. 
This redistribution of power among international actors may seem 
abstract.  Yet given the often close connection between breakdowns in state 
authority and grave crimes and the often vigorous disputes, both academic 
and political, over how (if at all) to balance peace and justice,128 the ICC’s 
powers in this regard are hardly insignificant.  Recall how stability was the 
core concern of the framers of the UN Charter and how the Council’s 
powers and rules were explicitly crafted to ensure stability, both among and 
between the great powers and their informal empires.129  In such a context, 
the ability of the court to enter a conflict with an indictment becomes more 
than simply a matter of justice.  It has the potential to upend carefully 
crafted compromises and strategies and insert considerations of law into 
what were, traditionally, largely political deliberations. 
Yet the court also offers real advantages to the Council. Because its 
work sounds in the language of justice, the court can, when working 
alongside or in ways consistent with those of the Council, add an element of 
legitimacy to the sometimes craven and cynical deliberations of the 
 
127. Rome Statute, supra note 47, art. 16. 
128. See, e.g., Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of A Global Standard of Justice: Peace, 
Pluralism, and Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
801, 804 (2006) (discussing the role of the Office of the Prosecutor and the proper weight it 
should give potentially conflicting claims of peace, pluralism, punishment, and justice); Linda M. 
Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan Alternative 
Justice Mechanisms, 23 CONN. J. INT’L L. 209, 210 (2008) (noting that international courts may 
negotiate peace in international conflict at the expense of justice but considering how courts can 
sometimes achieve both); Linda M. Keller, The False Dichotomy of Peace Versus Justice and the 
International Criminal Court, 3 HAGUE JUST. J. 12, 13 (2008) (explaining how the conflict in 
Uganda supports the argument that the international community can sometimes accept a peace 
deal for impunity while promoting justice); Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 81, at 5 (arguing that 
the prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities according to universal standards risks causing more 
atrocities than it would prevent); Noah Weisbord, Judging Aggression, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 82, 88 (2011) (suggesting that the ICC should promote peace as it does justice by assessing 
contextual factors in its interpretation of the law). 
129. See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶1 (declaring that the purpose of the United Nations is to 
maintain international peace and security). 
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Council.  By appearing to “do something,” even if ineffectually, the ICC 
can take some heat off the Council in situations that the Council would 
rather not delve into.  The ICC is also consistent with some important goals 
of the Council.  To the degree the ICC is successful as a deterrent to 
atrocities, it furthers the overarching aim and raison d’être of the Council to 
preserve and secure global peace and security.  And to the degree the ICC, 
through the doctrine of complementarity, builds judicial capacity in 
member states, it furthers the Council’s interest in promoting the rule of law 
locally. 
Given these differing interests, what kind of approaches, if any, would 
overcome the barriers to a sound relationship between the two institutions? 
Structurally, the most important measure would involve the 
establishment of a regular channel of communication between the two 
institutions.  The Council now has an informal Tribunals Working Group, 
devoted to issues related to the ICTY, ICTR, and Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon.130  The members of the working group streamline Council 
decision-making in the area.131  An expanded working group should enable 
discussions of the ICC as well; it would not commit any Council member to 
any particular course of action with regard to the ICC’s work, as the group 
operates on the basis of consensus, but would provide a forum for technical 
and relatively quiet discussions on a range of areas of common concern.  A 
working group need not focus solely on Council-referred cases, especially 
given the engagement of the Council in areas such as the Cote d’Ivoire, 
Central African Republic, DRC, Kenya, Mali, and Uganda.  The court’s 
annual report to the UN132 could serve as the basis for identification of court 
needs. 
In addition to structural innovations, a number of substantive changes, 
some more politically realistic, some less, would serve to protect the court 
and advance state cooperation with it.  We briefly describe several here: 
1. Obligate States to Cooperate with the Court.—Referral resolutions 
have imposed obligations on the target states, Sudan and Libya, and other 
parties to the conflict, and they have encouraged cooperation by other states 
and regional and international organizations.133  This is helpful, but falls 
short of the more concrete and sweeping obligations imposed under the 
resolutions establishing the ICTY and ICTR.  Article 29(2) of the ICTY 
 
130. Working Groups, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_ 
organs/working_groups.shtml#cat6 [http://perma.cc/86CJ-HYBS]. 
131. Id. 
132. Negotiated Relationship Agreement Between the International Criminal Court and the 
United Nations, art. 6, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/3/Res.1 (Apr. 10, 2004); United Nations Gen. 
Assembly, Rep. of the Int’l Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/69/321 (Sept. 18, 2014). 
133. S.C. Res. 1970, ¶¶ 4–6, 9–21 (Feb. 26, 2011) (deciding that the government of Libya 
shall cooperate with the ICC and provide assistance to the court and prosecutor and proclaiming 
an arms embargo, asset freeze, and travel restrictions to Libya for member states of the Rome 
statute); S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 2 (Mar. 31, 2005) (deciding that the government of Sudan shall 
cooperate with the ICC and provide assistance to the court and prosecutor and encouraging the 
ICC to support international cooperation with domestic efforts to promote the rule of law and 
protect human rights). 
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Statute, which obligates states to comply with trial chamber orders, should 
be a model for such obligations.134  Council referrals involve the same kind 
of policy motivations that led to the ICTY and ICTR; likewise, the Council 
should impose similar kinds of obligations.  Again, they need not be limited 
to referral situations, since the Council’s engagement in other areas—such 
as the DRC—clearly indicates the Council’s expectations of support as 
well. 
2. Extend Key Rome Statute Protections in Referral Situations.—
Privileges and immunities of international civil servants advance 
cooperation, and indeed are central and long-standing features of 
international law precisely because they enable international relations.  The 
work of any international institution will be undermined if governments do 
not respect the individuals conducting work on behalf of it.  Libya 
highlighted this problem in June 2012 when registry and defense counsel 
officials were detained for a month, triggering a rare press statement on the 
ICC from the Council.135  All states, especially those subject to 
investigation, should accord court officials all necessary privileges and 
immunities so they may carry out their work efficiently and without 
external intervention.  Under Article 48 of the Rome Statute, Office of the 
Prosecutor and Registry staff “shall enjoy the privileges and immunities and 
facilities necessary for the performance of their functions, in accordance 
with the agreement on the privileges and immunities of the Court.”136  This 
provision should be extended in application to all states at the time of 
referral, and the Council may consider extending it in specific nonreferral 
cases. 
3. Promote Funding in Referral Situations.—The funding restriction 
appears inequitable to many, as it enables the Council to use the ICC as a 
Chapter VII tool without providing even a portion of the resources for the 
ICC to carry out its functions.  
Moreover, many argue that, because the General Assembly has 
budgetary authority in the UN system, the Council cannot, as a 
matter of law, preclude the Assembly from budgeting for ICC 
situations.  On the other hand, some P-5 governments argue that the 
Council is not obligated to provide such resources, and that the Rome 
Statute states parties have committed to a process that includes the 
possibility of Council referrals without any concomitant obligation of 
the Council to fund them.  Moreover, they argue, the Court itself 
benefits from a docket of important cases.   
 The ultimate issue has less to do with legal norms than functional 
realities: the Court’s capacity to pursue investigations and 
prosecutions is stretched at a time when its docket is full.  The 
 
134. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of S.C. 
Res. 808, art. 29, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). 
135. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on International 
Criminal Court Staff Detained in Libya, U.N. Press Release SC/10674-AFR/2405-L/3196 
(June 15, 2012). 
136. Rome Statute, supra note 47, at art. 48, ¶ 3. 
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budget, adopted by the Assembly of States Parties each year, is 
unlikely to support further serious referral cases.  Future referrals 
should seek to eliminate the offending funding paragraph and replace 
it either with nothing or with a more encouraging commitment of the 
Council to assist the Court in financing referral-related work.137 
[AU3] 
4. Eliminate Jurisdictional Restrictions.—Limitations on jurisdiction 
undermine the reputation and credibility of the court and are widely seen as 
political concessions to nonparties—in particular, Russia, China, and the 
United States—that do not recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction over their 
nationals.138  These provisions respond to an unlikely hypothetical situation, 
and yet they generate considerable frustration among supporters of the 
court.139  The symbolic importance was captured by the South African 
Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN when he asked, “How can the 
Council begin to trust the Court and, consequently, expect others to trust it, 
when it is unwilling to subject nationals of its member countries to the 
scrutiny of the ICC?”140 
5. Work with Regional Bodies, Especially the African Union.—The 
ICC’s ability to generate Council support will depend on the support of 
critical regional organizations as well.  Much has been written about the 
African Union and the general problem, or phenomenon, of African focus 
by the ICC,141 and we only pause here to note that a more positive approach 
by the African Union could be helpful in generating the support of other 
actors, especially China.  Unfortunately, developments in 2016 seem to be 
militating against African Union support, as Kenya’s President Kenyatta, a 
former indictee of the court, has been vigorously advocating for African 
Union member–states to consider withdrawing from the Rome Statute.142 
6. Conduct Diplomacy in New York to Encourage Support for Council 
Improvements Related to the ICC.—Early indications suggest that China 
 
137. KAYE ET AL., supra note 72, at 21. 
138. See INT’L PEACE INST., supra note 47, at 3 (discussing the relationship between the UN 
Security Council and the ICC and the limitations of jurisdiction of the ICC). 
139. See U.N. SCOR, 67th Session, 6849th mtg. at 9, 11–12, 16 U.N. Doc. S/PV.6849 
(Oct. 17, 2012) (showing supporters of the ICC noting preferences for expansive jurisdiction 
which would include nationals and others (notably China, the United States, and Pakistan) arguing 
that some cases should be left to national jurisdiction). 
140. Id. at 16–17. 
141. See, e.g., TENDAYI ACHIUME, U.C., IRVINE SCH. L. ICC-UNSC WORKSHOP, THE 
AFRICAN UNION, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, AND THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL 6–7 (2012) (discussing the tensions between the African Union and the ICC and the 
perception the ICC is an “African Criminal Court” rather than an international court).  See 
generally Charles C. Jalloh, Dapo Akande & Max du Plessis, Assessing the African Union 
Concerns About Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 4 AFR. J. 
LEGAL STUD. 5 (2011) (assessing the African Union’s concerns regarding Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute). 
142. Isaac Mugabi, ICC: What Next for Africa and the Tribunal in Quest for Justice?, DW 
(Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/icc-what-next-for-africa-and-the-tribunal-in-quest-for-
justice/a-19020659 [https://perma.cc/F6NL-NBEA].  
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and Russia may be reluctant to move forward on some of the more 
promising efforts to build the Council–court relationship, even in the 
technical sphere of the Council’s informal Tribunal Working Group.143  ICC 
supporters, especially the UK, France, and the United States, should work 
closely with the Chinese and Russian delegations to identify the concerns 
and develop ways to overcome them.  This could mean a limited mandate 
for the working group at the outset, focused on technical exchange of 
information, and deferral of some of the recommended policy changes. 
7. Involve China and Russia in Unofficial Meetings Related to 
International Justice.—The United Kingdom, France, and the United States 
have expressed relatively consistent support for the ICC in recent years and 
have engaged with the community of governments, NGOs, and scholars 
thinking through how to improve the institution and cooperation with it.144  
Chinese and Russian delegations have participated less regularly in 
discussions outside the Council or Assembly of States Parties.145  ICC 
supporters should seek to involve Chinese and Russian counterparts in the 
efforts to build a constructive Council–court relationship by including them 
in unofficial discussions.  Neither government is a confirmed spoiler of the 
court; each has accepted the referrals of situations to the ICC and joined in 
the Council resolutions expressing support for ICC activity in nonreferral 
situations.146  Each said supportive things about the ICC’s work during the 
October 2012 open debate on the court.147  But, they have not sufficiently 
participated in the range of conversations about the relationship otherwise.  
An active approach to bring them into those discussions could go a long 
way. 
8. Build a Knowledge Base over the Long Term.—Knowledgeable 
actors at the domestic and international levels should begin a long-term 
 
143. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 72, at 10–13 (chronicling China and Russia’s policies and 
reactions towards Council–court relations). 
144. See id. at 9–10, 16 (discussing France and the UK’s support for the ICC and the United 
States’ better relationship with the ICC in recent years, as well as the important role NGOs play in 
the development of the ICC). 
145. See UNIV. OF CAL. IRVINE SCH. OF LAW, THE BEIJING WORKSHOP ON THE UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: SUMMARY OF 
DISCUSSIONS 2 (2014) (“Yet while the governments of Russia and China have remained non-party 
observers . . . of the activities of the ICC, until recently neither they nor Russian and Chinese 
academics and analysts have been actively engaged in international discussions about the Court 
and its relationship with the Council.”), http://councilandcourt.org/files/2014/06/Beijing-
Workshop-Proceedings.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY6L-ED6B]. [AU4] 
146. See, e.g., Joel Wuthnow, China and the ICC, DIPLOMAT (Dec. 7, 2012), 
http://thediplomat.com/2012/12/china-and-the-icc/ [perma.cc/56GR-TLD7] (noting, for example, 
China’s agreement to launch ICC tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, 
its acquiescence to a referral of Darfur in 2005, and its vote in 2011 to refer Libya’s Muammar 
Qaddafi); The International Criminal Court Bares its Teeth, ECONOMIST (May 12, 2011), 
http://www.economist.com/node/18682044 [https://perma.cc/9JHH-D3G2] (noting, among other 
things, Russia’s acquiescence to various referrals). 
147. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6849th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6849 (Oct. 17, 
2012) (stating the ICC is “an integral part of the international system of the rule of law”); id. at 
19–20 (calling for broader support for the ICC and expressing hope the ICC would become a 
“truly universal organ of international criminal justice”). 
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process of engaging foreign policy analysts on ICC issues.  Sustainable 
Chinese and Russian support for a cooperative Council–court relationship 
will require exchanges that go beyond legal scholars and involve security 
and policy analysts in government and academia.  International criminal 
law experts in China and Russia, natural constituencies to support national 
engagement with the ICC, would benefit from a higher profile in 
policymaking circles.  Court supporters could encourage this in a number of 
ways: engage them in building educational programs for non-law analysts 
in government (and, for China, Party) institutions; establish collaborations 
that involve domestic thinkers in addressing international justice issues; 
help academics and analysts take research trips to The Hague and to 
institutions in the United States and Europe; and fund internship 
opportunities for promising students. 
9. Identify Areas of Collaboration in International Justice.—Chinese 
and Russian officials have expressed commitment to the principles of 
accountability and justice, and their delegations have repeatedly voted in 
favor of ICC-supportive resolutions at the Council.148  These 
demonstrations of support should be advanced and nourished.  Beyond the 
ICC, there are areas where Chinese engagement in particular could be 
especially useful, such as helping to build national jurisdictions (perhaps by 
involving Chinese help in infrastructure building).149 
Conclusion 
The International Criminal Court “represents one of the world’s most 
elaborate experiments in enforcing legal restrictions on violence.”150  
Although it suffers from many grave infirmities that have severely limited 
its reach and power, the ICC is nonetheless a major step forward in the long 
and arduous quest for justice at the international level.  David Bosco’s 
Rough Justice ably documents the most recent twists and turns in that quest 
and details how, in his words, “powerful states and a potentially 
revolutionary court learned to get along.”151 
For all its power and promise, the ICC functions in a larger framework 
of global governance.  At the core of this framework rests the great powers.  
Without the strong support of those powers, the ICC will remain a niche 
player with much of its docket driven by external actors and factors and 
little ability to make a difference in the hardest cases.  The Security Council 
is both the primary institutionalized forum for great power politics and the 
key interlocutor for the court.  Building deep support within the Security 
Council will be essential to the court’s future.  This will not be easy, 
especially since China, Russia, and the United States remain nonparties to 
 
148. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 72, at 10 (stating that China and Russia have participated as 
observers in ICC meetings and have joined Council resolutions and statements supporting the 
ICC). 
149. See DAVID A. KAYE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, JUSTICE BEYOND THE HAGUE: 
SUPPORTING THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN NATIONAL COURTS 28 (2011) 
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the court, with little prospect of change.  Yet the court has great potential as 
a tool to help the Council achieve its mandate “to promote the 
establishment and maintenance of international peace and security.”152  In 
the long run, a strong Council–court relationship may prove impossible.  
But it is in the interest of both institutions to try very hard to achieve it. 
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